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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to find if family ownership in companies has an effect on 
firm performance in Finnish NASDAQ OMX Helsinki stock exchange listed companies 
during 2007 to 2013. Furthermore, the thesis studies if family ownership leads to better 
performance than other ownership structures. The topic is current because academic 
empirical research has focused on the topic only for the past decade and mainly during 
booming years.  
 
Family ownership is one of the most common ownership structures in the world and 
they have common specific features. The families try to retain the control of the 
company, they are usually risk averse and the family companies usually have on 
average longer investment horizons than other companies. Families usually have most 
of their wealth invested in the company and see their company more as a heritage to 
their descendants and therefore are not so interested in short-term firm performance.  
 
Because of the specific features of family firms, the effect of family ownership on firm 
performance can be studied with the help of agency theory. Can the firms lower the 
agency costs by acting both as the owner and the management? Furthermore, do the 
conflict of interest and the costs of families striving for private benefits stay at a 
reasonable level and thus not harming the firm performance? 
 
By utilizing hand collected panel data from Finnish listed firms during 2007–2013 and 
random effects GLS regression, this research shows evidence that listed family owned 
firms do outperform other firms when measuring performance with accounting 
performance ratio ROA and when observing against other listed firms in general. Unlike 
in previous international studies, no evidence for so-called founder effect could be 
found from listed Finnish family firms. Furthermore, when identifying other controlling 
shareholder blocks, no evidence of outperformance by family firms could be found. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Family Ownership, Return on Assets, Tobin’s Q, Firm Performance, 
Corporate Governance, Panel Data 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background, Motivation and Previous Main Studies 
 
Firm value is a major topic in financial discussion. Investors analyse a variety of factors 
to find the firms that consistently perform above average. One of these explaining 
factors is ownership structure. In the modern day world a large amount of the publicly 
listed companies, are owned by a wide range of shareholders. This may lead to 
problems when managers are not monitored well enough. Managers in a diversely 
owned company may be able to pursue their own interests and maximize their own 
value in the company, while discarding the real mission of their job – maximize firm 
value. Managers may eat the profits of corporations for their own personal benefit. An 
example of this might include flying with private jets or eating in expensive restaurants. 
With behaviour like this the managers lower their firm value. This is known as the 
agency problem, where the firm owners and the managers have conflicts of interest. 
Shareholders often try to solve the agency problem by trying to combine the interests of 
shareholders, with the interest of the company’s agents (the managers). This can be 
done by making the managers owners of the company or interested in the market value 
with a help of performance bound bonus structures or option contracts. However the 
functionality of these compensation plans may be questioned. It can be argued that for 
example that the recent financial crisis started from poor managerial decisions. 
(Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 290–298.) 
 
Family owned companies are defined as companies where the founder or a member of 
the founder’s family acts as an officer, director or owns a significant amount of shares 
of the company as a group or alone
1
. Several recent studies have analysed the 
relationship between firm performance and family ownership. Family owned firms have 
unique features that distinguish them from firms with other companies with different 
ownership structure. The academic literature has debated if the ownership structure has 
an effect on firm value. For example Berle and Means (1932) suggest that concentrated 
ownership structure should correlate positively on firm performance, while Demsetz 
(1983) suggest the opposite. Bearle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
also discussed two agency problems. A large shareholder has a greater interest in 
                                                        
1 Definitions of family ownership differ in the academic literature. The definition provided is chosen 
based on the definition of family ownership by the Finnish Family Firm Association. The definition is in 
line with the definition used in the recent empirical research from the topic (see for example Villonga & 
Amit 2006, Anderson & Reeb 2003 and Anders 2008) 
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monitoring the managers but at the same time they may take advantage of their position 
to gain extra benefits at the expense of the smaller shareholders. If the ownership is 
divided to a larger portion of smaller investors, the agency problem of large 
shareholders taking advantage of the smaller shareholder diminishes, but at the same 
time monitoring of the managers is also minimal. However if the large shareholder is a 
family or an individual the monitoring of the managers is high but the risk of the large 
shareholder taking advantage of the smaller shareholders is also higher. The question 
here is which one of the two agency problems leads to bigger costs and has a greater 
negative effect on firm value? 
 
Previous studies have confirmed the so-called “founder effect”. This is a phenomenon 
where the founder, acting actively within the company, has a positive impact on firm 
performance. Confirming results have been shown in the US from, for example 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Pérez-Gonzáles (2001). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that in the S&P500 family controlled firms perform 
better then widely held firms do when a descendant acted as the CEO.  Furthermore, 
they found that when the founder acted as the CEO of the company, it seemed to have 
the strongest positive effect on firm value. Consistent with these studies, Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) established that when the founder acted as the CEO or as chairman of the 
board with a hired professional CEO, firms tended to trade at a premium amongst other 
Fortune 500 companies. However Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Pérez-Gonzáles 
(2001) findings of the descendant-CEO were inconsistent with findings from Anderson 
and Reeb (2003). They found that descendant-CEO’s have a negative effect on firm 
performance. Moreover, consisted with the US findings, Maury (2006), Barontini and 
Caprio (2006), Sraer and Thesmar (2007) and Anders (2008) found that family activity 
leads to better performance in the Western European countries.  
 
Family ownership and control is a common feature in the world. For example La Porta 
(1999) showed that in worlds 27 wealthiest countries, depending on the size of the 
company, 30–50% of the companies were family owned and controlled. Furthermore, 
Faccio and Lang (2002) showed that 44.29% of Western European companies were 
family owned and controlled. Moreover Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) found that 
family companies account for over half of all companies in the Eastern-Asian markets. 
Even though academic literature regarding firm ownership structure and agency theory 
is relatively old and goes back to the 1970s, the empirical academic research on the 
topic has only recently gained attention. One explanation for the lack of older research 
is presented by Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001). They showed that the evolution of 
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efficient capital markets and the sale of family owned companies were positively 
correlated. More family companies are entering the capital markets and therefore 
understanding the results of family ownership and performance are a current 
phenomenon.  
 
 
1.2. Purpose of the Study and Contribution 
 
The previous studies have mainly focused on comparing founder family firm 
performance to other companies in general. This study extends these studies and 
compares the performance of companies with family owned companies to other 
blockholders, such as government or financial institutions. Moreover, most of the 
previous studies have not studied the family firm performance during the recent 
financial crisis or during bad economic times in general. As seen from figure 1, this 
time period has been a time of slow GDP growth and extraordinary low interest rates 
and thus makes it an interesting time period to study this topic. This thesis focuses on 
listed non-financial Finnish companies from 2007 to 2013. The purpose is to answer if 
family firms are superior in terms of performance during recent slow growth time 
period in Finland. For my knowledge the used method has not been used to Nordic data. 
Therefore, this study will contribute to the existing literature by widening to Nordic 
region. Furthermore, the results will give insight on how family owned companies 
perform during challenging economic times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: World Bank EU and Finland annual GDP growth and 3-month Euribor. 
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Euribor EU FIN
 12 
1.3. Possible Benefits of Family Ownership 
 
Families are a unique type of owners to companies. They have a strong economic 
interest in the survival of the company, because usually they have a significant part of 
their wealth invested in the company. In other words their wealth is not well diversified 
so it is in the interest of the family to monitor the management and the company. In 
many cases the family owners are also part of the executive board of the company. This 
leads to minimization of owner-manager conflicts. Long running family owned 
companies also experience loyalty and trust from their employees and creditors. This 
leads to lower costs of recruiting, lower cost of debt and long-term commitments to the 
company. Also the family knowledge of the company and the industry, and their 
commitment to longer-term investments generates value to minority shareholders. All of 
the above are examples how family control and ownership reduce agency problems and 
costs, thus improving the firm performance. (Anders 2008; Anderson & Reeb 2003.) 
 
 
1.4. Possible Costs of Family Ownership 
 
On the other hand family ownership and control might lead to extra costs to the firm 
and therefore to a worse performance. The families make decisions that maximize their 
own interests and these interests might not be in line with the minority shareholders. 
This might lead to families investing to non-optimal investments. For example because 
most of the wealth of the family owners are invested in the company, they might try to 
reduce their risk by diversifying company operations. This is inefficient and usually 
leads to poorer firm performance and reducing the value of the firm to minority 
shareholders. The family owners might also try to gain maximum private benefits by 
paying overcompensation to family members and having unqualified and non-
competent family members working at the company. This effect is especially strong if 
they are working at manager roles. These actions by the owner families grow the agency 
costs and therefore reduce the performance of the company. (James 1998; Anders 2008; 
Anderson & Reeb 2003.) 
 
 
1.5. Family Ownership in Finland. 
 
Companies in Finland are highly concentrated to families and many of the most known 
and largest Finnish companies are family firms. For example Kone, Cargotec, Fazer, 
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Ahlström and Sanoma are all family owned enterprises with a long history. According 
to Tourunen (2009) research of the ownership structures in the Finnish companies 
approximately 80% can be defined as family firms and they employ 40% of the private 
sector labor. Of the large and medium sized companies approximately 40% and 
approximately 25% of NASDAQ OMX Helsinki -listed companies are family owned. 
In total family firms account for over 20% of the top 500 largest firms in Finland. 
Tourunen’s research shows also that Finnish family owned companies tend to hire more 
workforce compared to non-family firms when the headcount was compared to the 
revenues.  
 
Family ownership in companies in Finland show similarities with family ownership in 
the US and Western Europe. The proportion of workforce employed by family firms is 
big and thus their significance economically is significant. As Neubauer and Lank 
(1999) put it, family firms are the backbone of the economy. 
 
 
1.6. Main Hypotheses 
 
The first hypothesis is the main hypothesis of the study. It answers, whether family 
firms are better performers than non-family firms.  Based on the hypothesis we are able 
to make conclusions if families are superior to non-family firms. 
 
H0 = There is no difference between family firms and non-family firms 
H1 = Family firms perform better than non-family firms 
 
The second hypothesis answers if younger family firms perform better than old family 
firms. 
 
H0 = Age of the family firm does not have an effect on the firm performance 
H2 = Age of the family firm does have an effect on the firm performance 
 
The third hypothesis answers if the market cap of the family firm has an effect on the 
performance of family firms. 
 
H0 = Market cap of the family firm does not have an effect on the firm performance 
H3 = Market cap the family firm does have an effect on the firm performance 
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The fourth hypothesis answers if founder effect can be found from the sample. 
 
H0 = No founder effect 
H4 = Founder effect is present 
 
The fifth hypothesis answers if families as controlling blockholders are superior 
compared to other controlling blockholders. 
 
H0 = There is no difference between different ownership blockholders 
H5 = Families as blockholders outperform other major ownership blockholders 
 
 
1.7. Structure of the Study 
 
The structure of this study is as follows. First, I introduce the theoretical background to 
capital -and ownership structure theories. Second, I will go through the features of 
family owned firms and give insight to specialties for this group of owners. Third, the 
main theory, agency theory, from what view the research problem is observed, is 
introduced. Following agency theory, the previous literature and research of the topic is 
introduced. Fifth, the data and the methodology used in the study are described and the 
empirical results of the study will follow. Last, I will summarize and draw conclusions 
of the study. 
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2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE  
 
 
Firm performance is tightly linked to the financial decisions of managers and financial 
reporting. Therefore, when observing firm performance, capital structure theories and 
optimal capital structure are important. Capital structure has been in interest of 
researchers for decades and the main theories regarding capital structure is presented 
next.  
 
 
2.1. The Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
 
Modligiani and Miller (1958) started the discussion of capital structure. The original 
theorem starts from the assumption that a company has a set amount of cash flows. 
When the company decides the amount of debt and equity to finance its asset, it just 
divides the set cash flows between debt and equity investors. The underlying 
assumption is that the investors have equal access to financial markets and thus have the 
possibility to access leverage or in contrary hedge it away. This leads to the irrelevance 
of the leverage ratio of the firm when measuring the firm value. In other words, it is 
irrelevant to investors how the company finances itself.   
 
The original 1958 Modligiani and Miller proposition assumed that there were no taxes, 
no transaction costs, no bankruptcy costs, equivalent access to information for all 
parties, debt has no effect on earnings before interests and taxes and as said before 
investors and companies have equal access to financial markets and thus equivalent 
borrowing costs. The original study is highly criticised because of these assumptions 
and thus also Moligiani and Miller extended their study to take into account dividend 
pay-out ratios and later also taxes. According to these studies dividend pay-out ratios do 
not affect share prices or total return to shareholders during perfect markets and 
financing irrelevance theory holds. However, when extending the theory to take into 
account taxes, Modligiani and Miller acknowledged that increasing debt would have a 
positive effect on tax savings and lowering the company’s weighted average cost of 
capital. (Modigliani & Miller 1961; Modigliani & Miller 1963.) 
 
As stated above Modigliani-Miller theorems have been highly criticised due to its 
assumptions and they have been shown to fail under various situations mainly when 
violating the underlying assumptions of the theorems. However, even though the 
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Modigliani-Miller propositions do not show a realistic description how to finance 
companies, they are the basis for the discussion and the development of capital structure 
theorems. (Harris & Raviv 1991.) 
   
 
2.2. The Trade-Off Theory 
 
The trade-off theory is an established term to describe a family of theories that started to 
exists in the aftermath of the original Modigliani and Miller theorem. The connecting 
factor between these theories is that in all of them the firm evaluates between different 
costs and leverage plans to achieve an optimal capital structure. The consensus of the 
trade-off theory discussion is in favour of overweighting debt to achieve tax shield and 
later adding bankruptcy costs to take into account the rising risk when companies are 
highly leveraged. The trade-off theories can be divided into two subgroups: static trade-
off theory and the dynamic trade-off theory. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 458-459.) 
 
2.2.1. Static Trade-Off Theory 
 
Under the static trade-off theory a company is assumed to have an optimal capital 
structure, which is determined by the trading off benefits and disadvantages of using 
both debt and equity. One of the most common examples of such on the debt side is the 
advantage of the debt tax shield. The advantage of the debt tax shield arises from the 
fact that when being more leveraged the company does not pay as much income taxes. 
In the contrary one of the most common disadvantage examples of debt are the 
bankruptcy costs, in other words the risk of financial distress rising together with the 
level of debt. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 458-459.) 
 
Previous literature has also linked agency costs to the static trade-off theory. The studies 
show that potential agency costs might arise when using equity financing. Agency 
theory and agency costs are discussed in depth in chapter 4.  
 
2.2.2. Dynamic Trade-Off Theory 
 
The dynamic trade-off theory differs from the static trade-off theory by having different 
optimal capital structures for different time periods instead of one static capital structure 
for all time. For example a company might have different optimal capital structures in 
different business cycles or periods. In other words in some cycles the company might 
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need more external financing to finance their operations or investments and thus the 
leverage ratio tends to be higher during these times than during times with for example 
lesser investments. The dynamic trade-off theory originates from the studies from Kane, 
Marcus and McDonald (1984) and Brennan and Schwartz (1984). Both studies analysed 
the trade-off theory using dynamic time periods and showed that companies optimize 
their capital structures to maintain high debt levels and thus having tax benefits. The 
studies took into account uncertainty and taxes but omitted transaction costs. 
 
 
2.3. The Pecking Order Theory 
 
The underlying characteristic and empirically backed assumption behind pecking order 
theory is that firms tend to prefer internal financing rather than optimize capital 
structure. In other words companies prefer to finance their operations and investments 
primary with internal funds and turn to external financing only when internal funds are 
insufficient. Moreover, when companies resort to external financing companies tend to 
use low risk debt financing and share financing as external financing methods. 
(Donaldson 1961.) 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) showed empirically that outside investors discount company 
shares when the companies issue equity instead of debt. This leads into managers 
naturally avoiding issuing equity and leading into pecking order using internal funds as 
a primary financing method, risky debt as secondary and lastly issuing equity to finance 
the company. To finance operations and investments internally, companies tend to 
retain earnings, when possible, to use on a later date. 
 
Empirical studies have given support for both trade-off theories and pecking order 
theories. Therefore, it has been difficult to conclude, which of the theories is more 
effective in the real world (see studies from for example Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and Fama and French (2002)). However worth noting is that, more recently a 
study from Leary and Roberts (2010) showed that firms are not really using pecking 
order theory with results showing only 20% using pecking order theory in debt and 
equity issuance decisions. 
 
 
2.4. The Market Timing Theory 
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According to the market timing theory, companies tend to optimize equity issuing 
during times when their stock is considered overvalued and do share buybacks when the 
prices are in a more normalized levels. Companies are able to act this way because 
investors act irrationally (Baker & Wurgles 2002). Empirical evidence from for 
example Graham and Harvey (2001) support the market timing theory and show that 
managers are trying to time the company equity issuances during times when company 
share prices are on a high level to benefit about the timing of the issuance. 
 
Further evidence to the market timing theory is given by Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
They studied market timing by constructing a market timing measure. The measure was 
constructed by weighting average external finance needs during past years of the 
company. They found strong positive and significant correlation between market timing 
and leverage changes within companies leading to a conclusion of capital structure of 
the firm being the cumulative result of trying to time the market.   
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3.  FEATURES OF FAMILY OWNED FIRMS 
 
 
Based on the previous academic literature and the research from family owned firms 
there are some common features amongst family owned firms. These features help to 
understand how and why family owned firms act as they do and give an insight on 
family owned firm decision making behaviour and motives behind them. First the 
ownership concentration and control-enhancing mechanisms are introduced. Ownership 
in family owned firms is concentrated to the family and they strive to control the 
company. The second feature is risk aversion behaviour. Family firms tend to be more 
risk averse to debt financing and risky investments in research and development. The 
last feature is longer investment horizons. Family owned firms tend to have longer 
horizon in their investments, which is explained by their longer commitment to the 
company.  
  
    
3.1. Control-enhancing Mechanisms and Ownership Concentration  
 
Large corporations are commonly characterized as companies with a wide ownership. 
Closer observation shows that there are vast differences with industries and ownership. 
For example La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) studied the company 
ownership and control and valuation in the 27–wealthiest countries in the world. They 
found that families owned 30% of the control of large companies when shareholders 
having more than 20 % of the voting rights were measured and 35% when measured 
having over 10% of the voting rights. Furthermore, they found that family ownership 
was the most common ownership structure in smaller companies. The amount of 
families owned companies were 45% when controlling with having at least 20% voting 
right level and 53% when having at least 10% of the voting rights.  Moreover, Faccio 
and Lang (2002) found that 44.29% European firms are family controlled. Family 
ownership was most common in continental Europe and most uncommon in the UK and 
Ireland. Also Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found that some industries have in average 
more individual controlled ownership, indicating a strong presence of family ownership 
in the companies. Consitent with La Porta et al. (1999) study they found that the control 
of the company is negatively correlated with the size of the company.  
 
Furthermore, De Angelo and De Angelo (1985) study revealed that many of the public 
firms that have dual classes of common stock had a substantial family involvement. 
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When a firm has dual classes of common stock, there are two common stocks to choose 
from. Usually they both have the right to the same amount of cash flow but the voting 
rights differ. This is a tool for stockowners to have more influence in the company.  De 
Angelo and De Angelo (1985) sample was 45 US based AMEX companies that had 
dual classes of common stock with same cash flow rights, different voting rights and 
could not be called back by the company. They found that in almost all of their sample 
firms’ corporate officials and their families focused on owning the share with the 
superior voting rights. These holdings resulted in a median of 56.9% of voting rights of 
the companies, but only a 24% right to total cash flows to shareholders. La Porta (1999) 
noted that the shares with the superior voting rights sold with a premium compared to 
common stock in the financial markets, emphasizing the value of owning voting rights. 
 
Consistent with De Angelo and De Angelo (1985), Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) paper 
examined how German family owned companies try to retain the control during initial 
public offerings (IPO). They hypothesized that family owned companies might 
introduce two kinds of shares, one without voting rights and the other with voting 
rights. Ehrhart and Nowak (2003) examined 105 IPOs between 1970–1990 and found 
results that supported their hypothesis. Usually, during an IPO, the German Family 
firms’ motives is to sell cash flow rights and not the complete stake of the corporation, 
thus maximizing the private gains and keeping control of the firm. Moreover Faccio and 
Lang (2002) found that dual classes of shares are common in the whole Western 
Europe. Families try to retain the control by both having voting rights with the help of 
dual class shares and by having different kind of cross pyramid ownership structures in 
the companies
2
. Consistent results with previous research were also found from 
Norwegian companies (Mishra, Randøy and Jenssen 2001). Furthermore Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) studied the ownership structures in East Asian Countries 
(Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand) finding that significant family control in over half of the 
companies and a presence of dual classed shares with different voting rights.  
 
Furthermore, for example James (1999) pointed out that the firms are eager the hire 
their own descendants and family member to the company to retain control. But he 
recognized issues of favouring family members when hiring new employees, especially 
managers. The family members were chosen because of the family relation and not 
                                                        
2 A simple example of a cross -or pyramid ownership is where both a holding company of the family and 
the family member own part of the company, thus having combined a larger stake of the company (Faccio 
& Lang 2002). 
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because of their skills. Other harming factors were for example conflicts between family 
members, instability and maintaining the harmony of the family, which lead to poor 
decision making, destroying the value of long-term investments and decline in firm 
performance. Both Fama and Jensen (1983) and James (1999) hypothesised that family 
firms should perform best when managed by outside managers with close monitoring 
from the family. Mishra, Randøy and Jenssen (2001) noted that families might be 
uneager to hire more capable professional management to run the business and the 
family businesses may interfere to the corporate decision making to gain personal 
benefits by determining the minority shareholder.  
 
 
3.2. Risk Aversion Behaviour  
 
Several studies of family owned companies show that the firms act in a more risk averse 
behaviour than non-family owned companies. This is seen for example in family owned 
firms’ capital structure. For example research from McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko 
(2001) studied the debt financing of publicly traded founder family controlled firms, in 
the United States. The research period was from 1986 to 1988 and the authors were 
trying to find whether the founder family controlled firms perform better than non-
founding family controlled firms and if founder family controlled firms debt financing 
was more risk averse.  
 
They tested their hypothesis by comparing founder family controlled firms debt-to-total 
asset –and cash dividend payout ratios with non-founding family controlled firms and 
found that ownership structure has an effect on firm capital structure and firm 
efficiency. The results were that there appeared to be a difference between the two 
comparable company types. Founder family controlled firms seemed to prefer long-term 
debt to short-term debt.  
 
McConaughy, Mishra, Walkerson and Mishra (1998) suggested that the founder family 
controlled firms are reluctant to use debt financing because they are risk averse to 
control risk. Compared to the non-controlled family firms, founder family controlled 
companies were less leveraged, because control risk becomes larger when companies 
are more leveraged and therefore more likely to go to bankrupt. McConaugy et al. 
(1998) sample was from listed US companies and they found that that founder family 
controlled firms use less debt financing and especially short-term debt. The behavior of 
avoiding short-term debt was explained by the more restricted covenants, refinancing 
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risk and the uncertainty to roll over short-term debt. McConaughy et al. (1998) also 
raised the concern that the reluctance to use debt finance may expose the firms to give 
up profitable investments projects and therefore lead to conflicts of interest between the 
family owners and the other shareholders. 
 
Firm future growth is heavily relied on their ability to bring new innovations to the 
markets. In other words this means investments to research and development (R&D). 
Investments to R&D are highly risky but still an important part of the companies 
surviving in the future. Therefore it is important to investigate if the family owned 
companies are as risk averse on the investments to R&D as they are in the debt 
financing.   Furthermore it is not efficient for the company to diversify risk away. It is 
more efficient for investors to diversify and reduce risk on their own but as families 
have most of their money invested to the family company this is naturally not possible 
and thus they diversify the risk inside the company. This only benefits the family and 
harms the other company shareholders and raises agency problems between them. 
(Villalonga & Amit 2006.) 
    
    
3.3. Longer Investments Horizons 
 
Literature from for example James (1999) suggested that time horizon for family owned 
companies is longer and therefore outperform other similar non-family owned 
companies from the same industry. Companies where the ownership and management is 
linked, the managers tend to strive for their own benefit and not the maximization of 
firm value. On the other hand firms where management and ownership is not linked the 
managers would strive for positive net present value investments but are still faced with 
the agency problems and costs of monitoring the management. James suggested that 
family owned companies differ from non-family owned companies by not having these 
problems. 
 
According to James’ (1999) paper the explaining factor for longer investment time 
horizons for family companies, is the welfare of their family. The welfare of the family 
is the motivation for the company to perform well now and in the future. In other words 
the families see the company as more than a company. It is a heritage for the future 
generations. This means that automatically the investment horizons are longer when the 
firms are planning the business future a long time horizon. Family companies choose 
investments with positive net present value and the focus is not on how fast the 
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investment pays the money back. Also the agency problem of exploiting the firm value 
is eliminated because of the emotional bond to the company. James (1999) also 
suggested that this effect tends to be stronger when the acting managers are founder 
family members and not hired managers. These suggestions were also consisted with 
findings from Andersson and Reeb (2003).  Their findings were that, family owned 
companies were considered as long term investors who treated the company as more as 
a heritage to descendants and therefore choosing long-term profitable investments. 
 
The views from James were also consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) statement that 
family owned companies perform better than companies without linkage with 
ownership and management because the savings in agency problem costs and also 
because family owned companies performance are highly tied to the families personal 
wealth. Because of the linkage to personal wealth the motivation to ensure the good 
performance of the company is higher at family owned companies compared to other 
companies without linkage between ownership and management. However, later Fama 
and Jensen (1985) corrected that the family investment process is not as straightforward 
as suggested earlier.  
 
To conclude, when family owned companies go public they do not want to lose the 
control of the company. The concentration of ownership and especially to a family is 
more common in the central European countries and Asian countries than in the US, but 
even in the US there are significant amount of companies with a control owning 
shareholder (Andres 2008). This means that the family has a substantial stake shares 
and the voting rights. This assures the family to still keep the company in their control 
by having family members on the top executive levels of the company and as board 
members. They tend to prefer investments on a longer horizon to keep the company 
profitable now and in the long future and family owned firms have a more conservative 
view on debt financing. All these features are linked to firm performance by agency 
problem and saving costs from monitoring the agent and from their bad decisions. 
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4. AGENCY THEORY 
 
 
Agency theory is a theory that explains the relationship between firm principals 
(shareholders) and their representatives (agents) in the company. Agency theory 
explains the problems of this arrangement, where ownership and control are separated 
and gives insight how to solve these problems. Agency theory was first introduced to 
the academic literature by Ross’ (1973) study The Economic Theory of Agency: 
Principal’s Problem.  
 
The main objective of companies is shareholder wealth maximization and this should 
also be the goal of managers (Brealey et al. 2011: 37). But wealth maximization has its 
problems. Usually it requires risk taking and this makes managers roles more volatile. 
Therefore management that does not act as owners of the company usually tries to 
maximize their own wealth. This brings us to the core of the problem that is introduced 
in the agency theory. Principals and agents have different views of the future of the 
company. The separation of ownership and control together with conflicts of interest 
and asymmetric information, is defined as the moral hazard problem by Ross (1973), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Fama and Jensen (1983). Because the moral hazard 
problem has a negative effect on the company it is in the interest of the principal to 
manage the moral hazard problem. The actions made by the principal to manage the 
moral hazard problem leads to different kinds of agency costs. Figure 2 illustrates the 
principal agency theory and the moral hazard problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Principal agency theory. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency costs as a sum of monitoring expenditures 
by the principal, bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss. The 
monitoring expenditures appear when the principal monitors the agent’s actions and 
makes efforts in controlling them by for example budget restrictions and operating 
rules. Bonding expenditures or bonding costs are costs from principal’s efforts to pay or 
compensate the agent to ensure them not to act against principal’s interest. The residual 
costs are the divergence in the welfare of the principle because of the actions of the 
agent after positive monitoring and bonding costs. In other words, even when 
monitoring and bonding costs are used in an agency relationship, agents still make some 
decisions that are not in the total favour of the principle. The total increases in costs that 
result from these actions are called the residual loss. Jensen and Meckling mention that 
it is nearly impossible to get rid of the residual losses, because principal’s viewpoints 
and manager’s decisions are never fully aligned. Jensen and Meckiling (1976) found in 
their research that the overall agency costs are positively correlated with the firm size. 
This means that the larger the company is the bigger the agency costs are. They 
concluded that the ownership and control should be combined to better align the interest 
of managers and owners and cutting down agency costs.  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) studied the effects of separating ownership and control in 
companies. They found that the affectivity of separating ownership and control 
depended on the size and complexity of the firm. In small corporations and 
organizations, where the decision management and control functions could efficiently 
be centralized to only a few agents, separation of ownership and control is ineffective. 
However, in more complex and bigger organizations the rising agency costs of 
separating ownership and control were seen as only marginal, compared to the more 
professional management obtained. Even though being effective to separate ownership 
and control in the latter firms, Fama and Jensen emphasized the importance of focusing 
on monitoring the managers, to keep the agency costs on a reasonable level. Also 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conclusions of large shareholders staying in the active 
management were consistent with the findings of Fama and Jensen (1983).  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) suggested that incompetent large shareholder staying in management 
roles can be one of the greatest costs of the company and costing more than the 
potential agency costs. 
 
Later Villalonga and Amit (2006) defined costs such as Schelifer and Vishny’s (1997) 
theorized costs of incompetent management, to be a reason of agency problem II. In 
addition to the more traditional view of agency problems presented by Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976), Villalonga and Amit (2006) noted that other agency problems might 
arise when control and ownership are combined to a large shareholder  (a family). They 
suggested that the large shareholder might take advantage of its controlling position to 
gain private benefits. The costs of monitoring and controlling, in other words the 
“traditional agency costs”, diminish but the efforts from the large shareholders to gain 
private benefits might exceed the costs of the “traditional agency costs”. These costs 
arise for example when families hire unqualified family members or the majority 
shareholders do other decisions that only benefits themselves. The traditional agency 
problem is from now on defined as agency problem I and the newer as agency problem 
II.  
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5. PREVIOUS LITTERATURE 
 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) showed that approximately one third of S&P 500 companies 
can be classified as family owned companies and their research was on how these 
companies perform. Their research focus was to find answers to four questions: if firm 
value of family firms is higher than the value of non-family firms, if there is a 
difference in the performance of young and old family firms, if family firms perform 
better, is the firm performance effected on the level of firm ownership and if the family 
level of involvement or the CEO decisions have an effect on firm performance? 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) sample size was 403 different firms, data span being from 
1992 through 1999, and the firms were categorized by standard industrial classification 
(SIC) codes to get a more accurate result from the ratios, ROA and Tobin’s Q. Their 
study was the first big sample study from the US and their method has been utilized in 
the studies afterwards. 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that on average family owned firms perform better 
than non-family owned firms. Family firms had a 6.65% higher ROA and 10% higher 
Tobin’s Q than non-family firms. Closer observation of the factors that lead to these 
results show that when the founder acts as the CEO it leads to significantly higher 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. Their findings show that descendant CEOs does not have a 
significant effect on firm performance and markets react to descendant CEOs the same 
way as for hired CEOs. The level of family ownership seemed to have a relation to firm 
performance. The firm efficiency is rising until the family owns approximately 30% of 
the firm outstanding equity. After this point the firm value declines from the effect of 
family ownership. However Anderson and Reeb (2003) point out the firms with family 
ownership over 30% of the outstanding equity still perform on average better than non-
family firms. The age of the firm had similar results than the family ownership of total 
equity. “young firms” seemed to have stronger impact on the firm performance than 
“old firms” but “old” family owned firms still performed on average better than non-
family owned companies.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) defined family owned firms 
“young” if they were younger than 50-years. Over 50-year old companies were 
categorized to the “old firm” category. 
 
Furthermore, Villalonga and Amit (2006) studied the effect of family ownership and 
especially the controlling and management effects on firm value. They constructed their 
study based on data from 508 firms listed on the Fortune 500 between 1994–2000. The 
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companies were also divided into categories by their industry, in the similar manner as 
in Anderson and Reeb (2003) study, and analysed with ratios Tobin’s Q and return on 
assets. Villalonga and Amit (2006) found family ownership creates excessive value for 
all shareholders only if the founder acts as the CEO of the company or the chairman of 
the board with a hired CEO. However, inconsistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003), if 
descendant–CEO runs the firm the firm value to minority shareholders is less than the 
value of non-family owned companies. Furthermore, family owned firms created most 
value when control-enhancing mechanisms were absent, in other words family owners 
were treated like normal shareholders. Consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2009) study also showed that founder family control has 
a positive effect on firm performance. They had a similar dataset with studying Fortune 
500 companies in 1992–1999, but modified the methods to take the possible endogenity 
better into account.  
 
King and Santorini (2008) studied family firms and firm performance in Canada. 
According to the authors, Canada represents an area with similar regulatory 
environment as the US but more concentrated ownership in firms. They found that 
family ownership as an attribute did not lead to underperformance but using control 
enhancing methods had a negative effect on firm value. Family firms with single share 
policy showed superior performance measured by ROA and equivalent market 
performance measured with Tobin’s Q as other firms. Family firms with active control 
enhancing policies, e.g. dual class of shares, had similar performance as other firms but 
underperform measured with Tobin’s Q. 
 
In addition, Pérez–Gonzáles (2006) used event study to find out what effect the choice 
of successor of the CEO has on firm performance. They studied 355 CEO-transitions 
between 1980 and 2000 in the US. Pérez and Gonzales found that the successor of 
founder-CEO has negative effect in the company ROA if they are related. They used 
event study to find if there are abnormal returns during the announcement day and 
studied also the long-term effect on firm performance. Pérez and Gonzales findings 
confirmed that in a substantial number of family companies, the successor CEO is a 
family member. They found that over the three year following period the companies 
experienced a significant negative 16% ROA. Further research showed that usually the 
descendant-CEO’s are not qualified and are much younger in average than outsider 
CEOs. The negative effect on performance was highly correlated with the level of 
education of the descendant-CEO. Promoting an unqualified descendant-CEO, benefits 
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the family but not all the shareholders and thus raises the “other agency costs” presented 
by Villalonga and Amit (2006). 
 
Moreover, Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) studied agency costs on firms with different kinds 
of ownership structures. They studied 1708 small non-listed companies in the US. They 
collected their data by utilizing the National Survey of Small Business Finances 
(NSSBF). They found that on average the small companies with one family controlling 
experience 3% lower agency costs, which lead to a better firm performance.  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of findings in Northern America. 
 
 
      
AUTHORS   DATA   RESULT 
Anderson & 
Reeb (2003) 
  
403 firms in 
S&P 500 
between 
1992–1999 
  
On average family firms have 6.65% 
higher ROA and 10% higher Tobin’s 
Q. Family ownership up to 30% has a 
strong positive effect on firm 
performance. Young family owned 
firms perform better than old. No 
difference between descendant–CEO 
and hired–CEO performance 
Villalonga & 
Amit (2006) 
  
508 Fortune 
500 firms 
between 
1994–2000 
  
Family ownership creates excessive 
value to shareholders when founder 
acts as the CEO or as the chairman of 
the board. Negative effect when 
descendant act as CEO 
Adams, 
Almeida and 
Ferreira 
(2009) 
  
321 Fortune 
500 firms 
between 
1992–1999 
  
Founder family control has significant 
positive effect on firm performance 
Pérez–
Gonzáles 
(2006)  
  
355 CEO-
transitions in 
public 
companies 
between 
1980–2000 
  
Substantial number of successors in 
Family owned firms are family 
members. Results on average to 16% 
lower ROA in the next 3 years. 
Descendant–CEOs are not enough 
educated to the job. 
Ang, Cole 
and Lin 
(2000)  
  
1708 non 
listed 
companies in 
the US. 
NSBBF 
survey 
  
Small companies owned by a family 
experience on average 3% lower 
agency costs. 
King and 
Santorini 
(2008) 
  
613 
Canadian 
firms 
between 
1998–2005 
  
Family firms with control enhancing 
methods underperform compared to 
other firms. If no control enhancing 
policies present, family firms 
outperform other firms. 
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Maury’s (2006) empirical findings from family ownership on firm performance from 
Western European corporations were consistent with the findings from Anderson and 
Reeb (2003). Maury (2006) found that family owned companies in Western Europe 
have on average 7% higher Tobin’s Q values and 16% higher return on assets than non-
family owned companies. The sample was constructed from 1672 non-financial firms 
from 13 Western European countries
3
. Maury (2006) research hypothesis were similar 
to Anderson and Reeb’s (2003). The study’s purpose was to find if family owned firms 
perform better than non-family firms and what is the effect of active and passive family 
control on firm performance.  
 
Maury (2006) findings were that active family ownership, in other words where at least 
two family members act as high ranked managers, has a positive effect on firm 
performance and passive family ownership does not. These findings are consistent with 
the suggestion of basic agency theory from Fama and Jensen (1983) that firm ownership 
diminishes the agency problem costs of monitoring management. In addition, when 
family equity shares was on moderate levels 10–40% had a positive effect on firm value 
measured by Tobin’s Q and firm performance measured by ROA when being over 30%. 
Furthermore, Barontini and Caprio (2006) studied, with a similar data to Maury (2006), 
family ownership and performance in continental Europe and widened the research to 
what effect family control, at founder and descendant level, has on firm performance. 
Their data consisted from 675 large companies (having more than €300 million in 
assets) firms from 11 countries
4
 from 1999 to 2001. They found consistent results with 
studies from the US with the founder acting as the CEO or non-executive director. 
Barontini and Caprio (2006) also found references that family involvement in the 
company management exists also at the descendant level, however these results were 
not statistically significant. Moreover they found that when families are not represented 
at the company board, the family owned companies perform worse than non-family 
controlled firms.  
 
Furthermore, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) studied 1000 publicly listed companies in 
France between 1994 and 2000. Family firms accounted for two thirds in their data 
sample.  They found that family controlled companies perform better than widely held, 
both when founder acts as the CEO and when there is a hired professional CEO. They 
                                                        
3 Countries included in the sample: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Maury 2006). 
4 Countries included in the sample: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (Barrotini & Caprio 2006) 
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also found that the positive effect of firm performance is also significant when the 
descendant-CEO runs the company. These findings are consistent with the findings 
from Barontini and Caprio (2006). 
 
Andres (2008) studied the difference companies with various kind of control owning 
shareholder blocks and their firm performance, trying to find out whether family 
blockholders outperform other controlling blockholders. The studied consisted of 275 
listed companies in Germany between 1998–2004. Germany was chosen because the 
listed companies in Germany have at least one controlling shareholder in up to 85% of 
the listed companies. The controlling shareholders varied from state and 
institutionalized ownership to family ownership. In Andres’ sample the family owned 
companies accounted for 37.5 % of the sample and on average they owned 63% of the 
voting rights, but only 48.7% of the cash flow rights, indicating the existence of dual 
class shares. 
 
Andres (2008) research found that on average family controlled firms outperform both 
other controlling shareholder blocks as well as widely owned companies. The family 
controlled blockholders were also the only blockholders showing statistically significant 
positive results on firm performance.  Family ownership resulted in a 3.1% to 4.5% 
higher ROA compared to other ownership structures. Further analysis also found that 
the family owned firms only performed better when the families were still actively 
involved in the company, acting either as an executive or having a board member in the 
board of directors and thus minimizing the agency costs. Furthermore the strongest 
positive performance of family ownership was when the founder of the company acted 
as the CEO. Without active involvement in the company, there could not be found a 
difference between family shareholder and any other shareholder of the company.  
 
Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) extended Andres method of studying if the family 
ownership is special to the Swiss market. As in Germany and in Western-Europe in 
general, in Switzerland family ownership concentration is highly common. Isakov and 
Weisskopf studied Swiss stock exchange listed family firms from 2003 to 2011. 
Consistent with previous studies, in general family firms perform better than non-family 
firms. However, they found that family ownership has a negative effect on the market 
values of the firms. Isakov and Weisskopf showed that with a higher than 80% 
ownership stake family firms destroy the market value of the company. However, when 
the ownership stakes are on a more moderate level the companies start to show superior 
performance compared to other firms and thus higher market valuations. 
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However, inconsistent with the other studies from Europe, Bennedsen, Meisner Nielsen, 
Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2007) found that descendant–CEOs and family 
ownership are significantly negatively correlated with firm performance in Danish non-
public and public companies between 1994 and 2002. They found that it leads to 4% 
poorer firm performance on average. The effect was especially strong on fast growing 
industries and industries that required high skilled labour. 
 
Previous studies relating to the family ownership and firm performance are very limited 
with Finnish data. In addition to Maury (2006) and Barrotini and Caprio (2006), the 
most comprehensive study from Finnish data is made by Tourunen (2009) together with 
Statistics Finland. Tourunen studied how many mid and large sized family firms there 
are in Finland, in which industries they operate and what is their economic impact to the 
Finnish economy. In addition, the research also covered the profitability of family firms 
and how family ownership and control affects the performance of the companies. The 
research found that, family firms are profitable and with and try to hold on to their 
employees, but not with a cost of poorer profitability of the company. The findings 
show that keeping their employees is as important to Finnish family firms as the 
profitability of the company. Furthermore, listed family firms seem to outperform other 
listed companies when measuring with ROI. Listed family firms have also higher equity 
ratio and lower net gearing ratio than other listed firms. Findings from family firm 
performance from Tourunen’s research are consistent with other European studies, but 
worth noting is that Tourunen used only univariate testing when measuring differences 
between family firm and other firms performance. This method is quite naive and thus 
not considered as good method as other previous research from this area. 
 
Both Maury (2006) and Andres (2008) noted that there was no significant relationship 
between family owned excessive control and firm performance. This indicates that in 
the Western European countries the shareholder protection laws are developed and thus 
the family owners as majority shareholders cannot act to their own benefit. When the 
majority shareholders cannot exploit the minority shareholders they seem to act as the 
protectors of the company and its future. This means that the conflict of interest and the 
agency costs between minority and majority shareholders diminish and thus also the 
negative effect on firm performance.  
 
Also Claessens et al. (2000) study from East Asian Countries indicates the importance 
of shareholder protection laws with family owned companies and their performance. 
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They found that excessive control of the majority shareholder affects negatively the 
firm value. They suggested that the difference in results between Europe and East Asia 
is in the shareholder protection laws. Wealth in East Asia is highly concentrated to a 
handful of families. Due to the lack of shareholder protection laws and more 
underdeveloped corporate governance regulations the families are able to act to their 
private benefits, which in return affects negative on the total firm value. These findings 
are consistent with La Porta et al. (1999) theory of the better the shareholder protection 
laws, the better the valuation of the company.  However, interestingly Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) findings from the US with negative correlation between family control 
enhancing mechanisms and firm performance from the US, which arguably have much 
more developed shareholder protection laws than Eastern Asian countries. Villalonga 
and Amit’s (2006) results were consistent with Claessens et al. (2000), but unlike in 
Eastern Asia, further analysis showed that the other benefits that Family ownership 
creates more value to minority shareholders than in non-family firms in the US. 
 
Moreover, Anderson and Reeb (2003) noted there is an endogenity problem with the 
study results. The study results do not take into account the fact that family owners 
might be exiting the poor performing firms early and thus the performance of family 
firms are better compared to non-family firms. The families have access to insider 
information and they have usually a good view of the industry. This together with the 
fact that most of the family’s equity is invested in the company, it is rational for them to 
exit companies with bad future growth opportunities. But in the other hand if the 
company has great growth opportunities they will stay active in the company. Andres 
(2008) also addressed this issue but said that it is highly unlikely that the firm families 
cannot forecast the firm performance decades in the future. They also showed that in 
their data, the family ownership had been stable for the past 82–years. This indicated 
that the families stick with the companies also with bad economic times. Arguably this 
shows the emotional link that families have with their company. Also Adams et al. 
(2009) found, with their method that took the endogenity better into account, that 
founder–CEO’s stuck with their companies both through good and bad times and were 
likely to sell the company in a good financial state.  
 
Furthermore, Miller, Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) noted that the results are 
sensitive to the definition of family ownership, thus explaining the differences in the 
study results from the same markets. Moreover Andres (2008) noted the differences in 
the definition of family ownership. The definitions of family ownership differ between 
studies. For example Sraer and Thesmar defined family ownership by having an 
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ownership stake bigger than 0%, whereas other studies have used significantly higher or 
multiple ownership stakes when defining family ownership (see for example Anders 
2008, Anderson and Reeb 2003). Obviously this has a significant impact on the study 
results.  When the ownership stake is defined at a lower stage, more companies are 
considered as family owned and makes the study results more challenging to compare. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of the findings from Europe. 
 
AUTHORS   DATA   RESULT 
Maury (2006)   
1672 non-
financial 
companies in 
Western Europe 
2003 
  
Family owned firms had on average 
7% higher Tobin’s Q and 16% higher 
ROA 
Barontini & 
Caprio (2006) 
  
675 large 
companies in 
continental 
Europe between 
1999–2001 
  
When founder acts as an executive or 
CEO firms perform better. If no 
family member represented on the 
company board firm performs worse. 
Sraer & 
Thesmar 
(2007) 
  
100 Publicly 
listed companies 
in France 
between 1994–
2000 
  
Family firms perform better than 
non-family firms, even when having 
hired CEO or descendant-CEO 
Andres (2008)   
275 publicly 
listed companies 
in Germany 
between 1998– 
2004 
  
On average family controlled firms 
showed 3.1%–4.5% higher ROA, but 
only when family is actively involved 
in the company  
Bennedsen, 
Meisner 
Nielsen, 
Perez-
Gonzalez and 
Wolfenzon 
(2007) 
  
Danish public 
and non public 
companies 
between 1994–
2002 
  
Family ownership leads to 4% poorer 
firm performance 
Isakov & 
Weisskopf 
(2014) 
 
185 Swiss stock 
listed companies 
between 2003–
2010 
 
In general family ownership leads to 
better firm performance. Family 
ownership over 80% starts to impact 
market valuations negatively. 
Tourunen 
(2009) 
 
Finnish Large 
and mid sized 
companies 
between 2000–
2005 
 
Listed family firms have better firm 
performance measured with ROI, 
higher equity ratio and lower net 
gearing compared to other firms.  
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Concluding the previous empirical evidence from the Western European countries and 
Northern America, the family ownership seems to be an effective form of ownership 
when the corporate governance regulations and the shareholder protection laws are on a 
developed level. This arguably is the case in developed countries such as Western 
European countries and the US. This conclusion is also consistent with La Porta, López-
de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (2002) findings from investor protection and company 
valuation. They found that the better the shareholder protection laws are, the better the 
valuation of the company is. Also Burkart, Panunzi and Schleifer (2003) theorized that 
if a country improves shareholder protection laws the valuation of the company should 
grow. They also stated that this would explain why efforts in creating better protection 
laws in developing countries face resistance. The current majority shareholders 
(families) would lose the possibility to gain private benefits from the company and the 
boost in firm valuation would benefit minority shareholders more. In agency theory’s 
terms the agency problem II presented by Villalonga and Amit (2006) diminishes when 
the shareholder protection laws are on a developed level and the firms are able to save 
in these agency costs. 
 
Moreover, the founder effect seems to be proven to exist both in Western European 
countries and the US. In other words it seems that when the founder acts actively in the 
company it has a positive effect in the company. This is explained because the deep 
knowledge in the industry and saving in the agency costs of monitoring the 
management. The conclusions about descendant management are not as straightforward 
as the founder. The descendants should only act in the company if they are competent to 
the position. This becomes more important, the more important position the descendant 
holds in the company. Especially when acting as the CEO, the descendant should be 
equally as good as or better than other professional CEOs, if the firm performance is 
emphasized. If the descendant is incompetent the agency costs between minority 
shareholders and the founder family grows, thus reducing the firm overall value. 
Deciding to heir the management of the firm to the descendant benefits the family but 
not the other shareholders. Both the founder effect and the descendant acting as the 
CEO are sensitive to the size of the firm. When the company grows and becomes more 
complex, grows also the likelihood for the family to need outside help to manage and 
fund the company. Figure 3 illustrates the conditions to better firm performance to 
family owned firms in Western Europe and the US. 
 
These findings are proof of the traditional agency problem I diminishing in family 
owned companies. As the control and the ownership are centralized, the firm is able to 
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save on agency costs and therefore having a better firm performance. However because 
there are conditions on firm performance having a positive effect on firm performance, 
we can argue that the agency problem II presented by Villalonga and Amit (2006) has a 
crucial role in this research question. But with the conditions listed above, we can 
suggest that the “other agency costs” stay at a reasonable level, the traditional agency 
costs decrease and families firms are able to perform better than non-family owned 
firms.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Conditions to better firm performance with family ownership in Western 
European and US companies. 
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
6.1. Measures of Firm Performance 
 
Financial measures and furthermore financial ratios are an important tool for both 
investors and financial managers. Financial ratios are used to measure the current and 
future performance of the firm. Financial managers use them to analyse their current 
projects and investors use ratios to help them with their investing decisions. Ratios are a 
good tool for investors to compare firms with each other. Financial ratios are usually 
derived from the firm’s financial statements and other publicly available data. They are 
good estimates but give no guarantee about the future. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 
704–720.) 
 
In the next part two financial ratios are taken into closer observation. The ratios are 
Tobin’s Q and return on assets. These two ratios are chosen based on that they are 
commonly used in academic literature and research regarding the topic of family 
ownership and its effect on firm performance. Therefore it is important to understand 
these two main ratios. 
 
 6.1.1. Tobin’s Q 
 
Tobin’s Q is a ratio developed by James Tobin (1969). The Q is calculated by dividing 
firm total market value by replacement value of the firm’s assets. Tobin’s hypothesis 
was that the market value of the firm should reflect to the firm real asset value and if the 
values differ the firm is over –or undervalued depending on the ratio value. 
 
 
(1) Tobin′s Q =
Market Value of the Firm
Total Assets
 
 
 
The numerator, market value of a firm, is calculated by multiplying the current stock 
price with the number of stocks. Of course this works only for publicly traded 
companies and calculating the market value of a privately owned companies is much 
more challenging. Total assets value is the current and fixed assets of a company and 
these can be found in the company’s balance sheet. 
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Following Tobin’s theory firm is considered as undervalued when Q gets a value 
between 0 and 1.  This means that the repurchasing price of the existing assets exceeds 
the market value of the company. The firm is considered as overvalued when Q gets 
values over 1. High Tobin’s Q can also be interpreted as investors’ expectations to the 
company. If markets have high hopes to the company the Q value will be higher. This is 
because the ratio takes only into consideration only the accountable capital, therefore 
capital that cannot be measured (intangible assets) makes the ratio values curve 
upwards. Therefore companies with high growth expectations or high value knowledge 
of certain area have better Tobin’s Q values. (Tobin 1969; Tobin & Brainard 1977.) 
 
6.1.2. Return on Assets 
 
The return on assets (later ROA) is a commonly used firm performance ratio. ROA is 
usually presented as a percentual number, which indicates the profitability of firm 
assets. ROA is calculated by dividing firm earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA), earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) or net income by 
total assets. In other words ROA shows how much revenue the firm assets create. The 
basic formula for ROA is as follows. 
 
 
(2)  ROA =  
 EBITDA or EBIT or Net Income
Total Assets
 
 
 
The numerator of ROA formula is EBITDA, EBIT or net income, or in other words the 
company’s annual earnings. EBITDA, EBIT and net income can be found on the 
company’s income statements in the given order net income being the last. In other 
words net income is company earnings after all deductions. EBITDA and EBIT are 
often used alongside net income when calculating financial ratios to diminish the 
differences in accounting procedures between companies (for example in depreciations 
and amortizations). The denominator, total assets, may sometimes also be presented as 
average total assets to get a more accurate view from the data. When using average total 
assets the asset value is an average between starting and ending values of assets from 
the firm and these numbers can be found, as with the Tobin’s Q, from the firm balance 
sheets. Total assets include all firm assets, both current and fixed assets. (Brealey, 
Myers & Allen 2011: 704-720.) 
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Using ROA has some disadvantages. The ratio is only useful to compare firms from the 
same industry with each other. This is because of the denominator total assets. The asset 
values between industries may differ a lot. For example industries that require a lot of 
assets, such as automotive industry, have lower ROA than industries such as software or 
consulting where the main asset is intangible. Therefore good ROAs in one industry 
may not be as good when compared to another industry. In academic research ROAs are 
also usually only used to compare firms in the same industry. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 
2011: 704–720.) 
  
      
6.2. Data Description  
 
The market and accounting data has been collected from years 2007–2013 using 
Worldscope & Orbis databases resulting 700 firm year observations. The firm specific 
ownership structures were hand collected from Orbis and company websites. The data 
collected is based on companies listed on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki stock exchange 
in the start of the observation period year 2007. Financial companies and banks are 
excluded from the data due to difficulties of comparing Tobin’s Q and ROA with other 
industries. Excluding financials is standard procedure in existing literature on the topic 
(see fore example Andres (2008) and Anderson and Reeb (2003)). Furthermore, 
companies that had been removed from the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki -stock exchange 
during the observation period were excluded from the data. Most common reasons for 
the exits were buyouts and bankruptcies. In total 45 companies were excluded from the 
data due to reason mentioned above resulting in end total of 100 observed companies. 
Moreover, the observed companies were categorized to Oil & Gas, Material, Industrials, 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Telecom, Utilities and Technology 
industries following NASDAQ’s categorization.  
 
By utilizing the Finnish Family association definition of listed family firms, a listed 
company is defined as a family firm if a person or their family owns or has acquired 
25% of the voting rights of the company and is actively involved in the company. Other 
additional confirming methods of identifying family firms are used in situations where 
identifying the company with the main definition is challenging. These situations appear 
especially with old families (for example Ehrnrooth and Ahlström families) that have 
investments in many different listed companies. These alternative identifying methods 
are for example common citations to the company as a family firm, company defining 
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Industry description Number of firms Family firms Non-family firms Family firms %
Consumer goods 15 5 10 33%
Consumer services 9 1 8 11%
Health care 6 1 5 17%
Industrial 40 13 27 33%
Materials 8 1 7 13%
Oil&Gas 1 0 1 0%
Technology 18 5 13 28%
Telecommunications 2 0 2 0%
Utilities 1 0 1 0%
Total 100 26 74
itself as a family firm and long term family commitment to the firm. For example in the 
case of Ehrnrooth and Ahlström families, with utilizing these additional identifying 
methods only a few of the companies controlled by these families can be identified as 
family firms. This definition of family firms results in a total of 26 family firms in 
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki during 2007–2013. 
 
 
Table 3: Number of non-family firms and family firms by industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the number of total firms and family firms in different industries. The 
biggest industries in the dataset are industrial, technology and consumer goods. 
Industrial companies represent 40% of the total dataset, technology 18% and consumer 
goods 15%. Also family firms have strong presence in these industries. Family firms 
represent 33% of all industrial and consumer goods companies and 28% of technology 
companies. In total 23 of the 26 (88%) family firms are categorized under these three 
industries. Family-firms are not present in oil & gas, telecommunications and Utilities 
industries in the dataset. Appendix 1 lists all the firms in the data sample, industries and 
identifies the firms that are categorized as family owned. 
 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of all of the firms. Summary statistics are shown 
as time series averages per firm, in other words each variable has been averaged across 
time for each firm giving only one observation per firm. Panel A shows the summary 
statistics for the whole data sample with all firms, panel B shows the summary statistics 
for family firms and lastly panel C shows the summary statistics for the non-family 
firms. 
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 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis
Age 76.28 67.50 366.00 8.00 52.27 1.87 10.62
EBIT  (€ 1000) 127510 11448 3036516 -138429 419803 5.24 31.88
EBITDA  (€ 1000) 210635 24577 4447438 -12455 622042 5.13 30.96
Employees 2757 2460 10629 47 2344 0.95 3.49
LT Debt / Total Assets 0.27 0.27 0.78 0.00 0.15 0.68 4.04
LN Total Assets 12.56 12.19 17.31 8.40 2.00 0.33 2.31
Net Income  (€ 1000) 79531 6916 1985690 -235571 288328 5.01 29.20
Turnover (€ 1000) 1763725 267901 38106000 5839 4502780 5.82 44.45
R&D Costs / Sales 0.36 0.02 4.57 0.00 1.06 3.25 11.98
ROA (EBIT) 0.05 0.05 0.32 -0.27 0.09 -0.75 5.33
ROA (EBITDA) 0.09 0.09 0.36 -0.26 0.09 -0.62 5.61
ROA (Net Income) 0.02 0.03 0.23 -0.44 0.09 -2.18 11.48
Tobin's Q 0.92 0.74 3.02 0.16 0.68 1.37 4.22
Panel B: Family firms
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis
Age 88.31 74.50 366.00 10.00 72.52 2.15 9.24
EBIT  (€ 1000) 50793 7476 674243 -4986 135543 3.99 18.67
EBITDA  (€ 1000) 75454 10917 742700 -2960 165381 3.08 12.02
Employees 3640 608 43298 23.00 7642 3.41 12.17
LT Debt / Total Assets 0.27 0.29 0.65 0.00 0.15 0.02 3.34
LN Total Assets 11.84 11.21 15.16 8.40 1.81 0.36 2.26
Net Income  (€ 1000) 33975 1529 506414 -6600 101391 4.13 19.64
Turnover (€ 1000) 699572 107759 5263800 5839 1263334 2.33 7.96
R&D Costs / Sales 8684 1453 72443 0 17425 2.49 8.56
ROA (EBIT) 0.05 0.04 0.21 -0.16 0.07 -0.47 4.48
ROA (EBITDA) 0.10 0.08 0.26 -0.12 0.07 -0.51 4.67
ROA (Net Income) 0.02 0.02 0.15 -0.18 0.06 -0.73 5.21
Tobin's Q 0.93 0.49 2.93 0.16 0.79 1.17 3.22
Panel C: Non-family firms
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis
Age 72.05 66.00 181.00 8.00 42.82 0.53 2.39
EBIT  (€ 1000) 154464 17438 3036516 -138429 479457 4.59 24.42
EBITDA  (€ 1000) 258131 40564 4447438 -12455 711749 4.45 23.35
Employees 6904 1903 132427 23 14684 5.79 41.94
LT Debt / Total Assets 0.28 0.27 0.78 0.06 0.15 0.89 4.21
LN Total Assets 12.81 12.53 17.31 8.78 2.01 0.28 2.24
Net Income  (€ 1000) 95537 8611 1985690 -235571 328973 4.40 22.53
Turnover (€ 1000) 2137617 365628 38106000 7668 5138546 5.11 34.14
R&D Costs / Sales 76840 2583 4695429 0 544801 8.40 71.73
ROA (EBIT) 0.04 0.05 0.32 -0.27 0.09 -0.75 5.15
ROA (EBITDA) 0.09 0.09 0.36 -0.26 0.09 -0.62 5.49
ROA (Net Income) 0.01 0.04 0.23 -0.44 0.10 -2.20 10.72
Tobin's Q 0.91 0.75 3.02 0.18 0.64 1.46 4.73
Table 4: Summary statistics of all firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3. Methodology Description 
 
Following the method by Andres (2008) the following panel data regression model is 
applied to the data: 
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(3)  Firm Performance = β0 + β1(family firm) + β2(control variables) + β3(industry 
dummies) + β4(year dummies) + eit 
 
 
,where Firm performance represents both ROA (EBITDA, EBIT & Net income) and 
Tobin’s Q. Family firm is a binary variable that takes value of 1, when observing an 
family company. Control variables used are natural logarithms of the firm age and total 
assets, ratio of long term debt divided by total assets, revenue, R&D costs divided by 
sales and the amount of employees. Industry dummies are constructed based on the 
NASDAQ company industry classification and lastly, the year dummies will take a 
value 1 for each year. Heteroscedasticity is corrected by using White corss-section 
robust coefficient covariance estimator. 
 
As the ownership structures of the observed companies stay stationary, fixed effects 
model cannot be used to the data. This is because one of the underlying requirements of 
the fixed effects model is longitudinal variation in the data. Therefore, the main method 
used to test is random effects generalized least squares (GLS) regressions. Pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are used as an alternative method and a 
robustness test to the model. Both of these tests are commonly used in the previous 
research (see for example Isakov and Weiskopf (2014), Andres (2008) and Anderson & 
Reeb (2003). 
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Variable Family firms Non-family firms T-statistic P-value
LT debt / Total assets 0.2703 0.2764 0.18 0.8611
Ln(Total Assets) 11.8414 12.8075 2.16 0.0335**
Number of Employees 2419 2876 0.85 0.3952
R&D / Total Assets 0.63 0.27 -1.50 0.136
Revenue (€ 1000) 699572 2137617 1.41 0.1624
Firm Age (Years) 88.31 72.05 -1.37 0.1738
Tobin's Q 0.9288 0.9127 -0.10 0.9181
EBIT (€ 1000) 50793 154464 1.08 0.2809
EBITDA  (€ 1000) 75454 258131 1.29 0.1992
Net Income  (€ 1000) 33975 95537 0.94 0.3516
ROA Net Income 0.0249 0.0146 -0.50 0.6163
ROA EBITDA 0.0967 0.0943 -0.12 0.9026
ROA EBIT 0.0516 0.0432 -0.42 0.6783
7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
7.1. Univariate Testing 
 
Table 5 shows the results of difference in means tests between family firms and non-
family firms. Test is calculated first by averaging variables across time per company 
and then calculating the mean across the firms. Unlike previous research (see for 
example Anderson & Reeb 2003, Andres 2008, Isakov & Weisskopf 2014), difference 
in means testing shows only statistical significant difference between total assets in 
family firms and non-family firms. Family firms in Finland tend to have lower average 
total assets compared to non-family firms. Further, the univariate test also suggests that 
family firms tend to be on average smaller when comparing revenues but seem to invest 
more into R&D than non-family firms. Moreover, family firms seem to be older than 
non-family firms. However, these findings from the company age, revenue and 
R&D/sales ratio are not statistically significant findings. Lastly, all the accounting 
measures (ROA EBIT, EBITDA and net income) seems to average slightly higher than 
non-family firms. Same effect is seen in the market ratio Tobin’s Q. These findings 
support the hypotheses of the thesis, but are not statistically significant.   
  
 
Table 5: Difference in means tests. 
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Table 6 shows a correlation matrix between the variables of the analysis. The 
correlation coefficients between variables are shown on the top row and t-statistics on 
the bottom row on each row. Similarly as the difference in means test, also the 
correlation matrix is constructed from one observation per firm time-series averages. 
Founding family ownership seems to have a positive, but weak, association between 
market and accounting measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA) used in the analysis. Consistent 
with the univariate analysis, family ownership is associated with a negative effect on 
total assets and positive in firm age, R&D/sales ratio. To understand family ownership 
effect in more depth a multivariate analysis is conducted. 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix. 
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7.2. Multivariate Testing 
 
Table 7 shows the results when observing family ownership in general. In other words 
all family firms are compared versus non-family firms. Panel A shows the results with 
using random effects GLS method and panel B shows results with the alternative pooled 
OLS method for robustness test. In columns 1 to 3 the accounting measure ratio ROA is 
used in the regressions as the performance ratio and in column 4 the market 
performance ratio, Tobin’s Q is used. 
 
The results show that family firms do perform better than non-family firms when 
measuring with accounting performance measures. The coefficients of the family 
dummy for the random effects model is 0.0163 (significant at the 10% level) and with 
Pooled OLS method 0.0121 and 0.0091 (significant at respectively 5% and 10% 
significance levels). However, when measuring firm performance with the Tobin’s Q no 
difference can be identified between the performance of family firms and non-family 
firms. 
 
 
Table 7: Firm performance and family ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
Following Anderson & Reeb (2003) example, table 8 represent results of further 
investigation if family firm age has an effect on the performance. Family firms are 
divided into two dummies representing old and young family firms. The used cut-off 
point between young and old family firms is 50-years as in Anderson & Reeb’s study 
resulting in 16 old family firms and 10 young family firms. 
 
Tobin’s Q regression coefficients of -0.1790 with the random effects method and -
0.1477 with pooled OLS method show that old family firms tend to perform worse than 
other firms (at respectively 10% and 1% significance levels). Moreover, results show 
signs that young family firms would outperform other firms when measuring with ROA 
(EBIT & Net Income), as the random effects method show results close to 10% 
confidence levels and results with the pooled OLS method show strong statistical 
significance at 1% level  
 
 
Table 8: Young and old family firm performance.  
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In table 9 family companies are categorised with their market capitalization rate. Large 
and mid cap companies are pooled together due to the limited number of large cap 
companies in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. The firms are divided into the groups utilizing 
NASDAQ’s OMX Helsinki’s official definition of less than 150 million euro market 
cap being small cap companies resulting in 11 large and medium cap and 15 small cap 
companies 
 
The ROA (Net Income) results show with 0.0335 with random effects method and 
0.0143 pooled OLS method (at respectively 1% and 5% significance levels) that small 
cap family firms do perform better than non-family firms. Also large and mid cap 
family firms show signs of better ROA, however not statistically significant when 
regressing with random effects method.  When measuring with the market performance 
ratio Tobin’s Q large & mid cap family firms continue showing strong performance 
with high confidence level but small caps do the contrary with strong negative results. 
 
 
Table 9: Large and mid cap & low cap family firm performance. 
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Previous research has confirmed a so called “founder effect” (see for example Anderson 
& Reeb (2003)), in which if the founder acts as the CEO of the company this leads to 
even better firm performance. Table 10 shows results of testing the founder effect 
within the thesis data sample. Due to the small sample size, family companies are 
divided into groups where the founder is still active in the company and where a 
descendant is active in the company. In other words the definition is not limited to 
acting as the CEO. With this grouping definition all 26 observed family firms can be 
divided either of the groups. Also due to the small sample size of the results might not 
be robust and should be interpreted as indicative results. 
 
The results show no evidence of founder effect. However, family firms where 
descendants are active show strong evidence of outperforming other companies in OMX 
Helsinki when measured with ROA (EBITDA, EBIT and net income). Results show 
strong statistical significance with both regression methods. 
 
 
Table 10: Founder and descendant run family firm performance. 
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Consistent with previous studies from Finland and the consensus in developed western 
countries, the results show both that family firms do outperform other companies and 
that young family firms are better performers than old family firms when measuring 
accounting performance. However, partly inconsistent with previous studies, findings 
do not support better performance when measuring with Tobin’s Q. In addition, the 
results show that small cap family firms tend to perform better than large and medium 
cap family firms when measured with ROA. Further, the results show that both family 
firm categories outperform other firms. Inconsistent with previous studies, the results 
show no evidence of founder effect in the data sample. However, as there are only a 
very limited amount of observations, these results can be interpreted only as indicative. 
These results allow us to accept hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 and decline hypothesis H4.  
 
Previous tests show that family ownership is positively associated with firm 
performance when compared to all other companies in the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
without specifying other major ownership structures. Table 11 shows results if family 
ownership is special compared to other identified common ownership structures.  
 
In addition to family ownership, three other major common ownership structures are 
identified in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. These are government blockholders, financial 
blockholders and strategic blockholders. Consistent with family firm definition, for a 
firm to be categorized to one of the other ownership structures the owner has to own at 
least 25% votes of the company and be a controlling shareholder. Government 
ownership represents any governmental ownership to the company. Financial 
blockholders represent majority ownership by private equity or other investing 
companies and strategic blockholders represent majority ownership by another 
company. 
 
The results show no evidence of family firms being superior in terms of performance 
compared to other companies with identified ownership blocks. Furthermore, 
government owned listed companies show statistical significant underperformance 
when measuring with ROA. Moreover, when measuring with Tobin’s Q companies 
with financial blockholder owners show better performance than other companies. 
Findings considering family firms are inconsistent with Andres’ (2008) findings from 
Germany and Isakov and Weisskopf’s (2014) findings from Switzerland. However, 
findings from the governmental blockholder are in line with the German results when 
measuring with ROA. These results lead to declining of H5. 
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Table 11: Family ownership versus other ownership structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost throughout the empirical results, the market ratio Tobin’s Q gave inconsistent 
results compared to previous studies. This may be because of the extraordinary interest 
rate environment that has been present since the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The interest 
rate environment affects equities in two ways, through the discount rates and flight for 
returns. In other words, low interest rates might lead to too high valuations in common 
cash flow valuation methods, such as the discounted cash flow mode, due to too low 
discount rates. Secondly low interest rates diminish fixed income returns and has 
resulted investment flow from fixed income to equities in hope of returns. It can be 
argued that these two factors that have been present during the time period of this thesis, 
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lead to too high market valuations and since Tobin’s Q is driven by market values, 
questionable Tobin’s Q ratios levels. However, this problem is not in the scope of this 
thesis and thus is not studied in depth. 
 
 
7.3. Endogenity 
 
Previous academic literature has indicated that the results may potentially suffer from 
the problem of endogenity. As Andres (2008) explained it when considering family 
firms: 
 
“In the case of family firms, the observed relation between family ownership and firm 
performance might be the result of a reversed causality. Strong performance could 
prompt families to keep their shares whereas poor performance might be an incentive to 
give up family control. Thus, the question is whether family ownership improves 
performance or good performance leads to long-lasting family ownership?” – Andres 
(2008) 
 
With Finnish data from the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki this problem becomes 
questionable. Families do have access to excess information compared to other 
shareholders, however it seems that they are not eager to exploit this position. Listed 
family firms are older than non-family firms and the family ownership in the companies 
is stable.  These observations of listed family firms diminish the endogenity problem. 
Family firms see their ownership in the company as more than an investment and seem 
to stick to them through bad economic times. 
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8. SUMMARY AND CONCULSIONS 
 
   
The purpose of this thesis is to find if family ownership in companies has an effect on 
firm performance and if they outperform other identified major ownership structures in 
the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki stock exchange during 2007–2013. Families account for 
one of the most notable controlling shareholder groups in the world and therefore it is in 
the interest of investors and researchers to find how family owned firms perform 
compared to other companies. Performance of family owned firms has been theorized 
for decades but during the last decade the topic has gained the interest of empirical 
academic research 
 
Firm performance and capital structure are tightly linked through financing ratios. 
Researchers have theorised several ways during the recent decades of determining the 
optimal capital structure of the firm. Starting from the original Modigliani and Miller 
theorems that started the capital structure discussion, academic literature have identified 
three major distinguished theories of optimal capital structures, these being the trade-off 
theory, pecking order theory and market timing theory. 
 
Family companies have a unique company structure and they have certain common 
features. Family firms tend to try to keep the control of the company and centralize the 
ownership within the family. They do this by implementing different kind of control 
enhancing mechanisms, most commonly issuing dual classes of shares when going 
public. Moreover, family owned companies often prefer family members working and 
managing the firm. Dual classes of shares strengthens families ability to have an impact 
to the future of the firm even when going public and by managing the company in 
managerial positions allows the family to control the company also on an operational 
level. Second, families usually have most of their wealth invested into the company and 
therefore it makes them more risk averse. Risk aversion can be seen for example in 
reluctance of accepting more risky R&D projects and avoiding debt. Last, family owned 
firms also tend to have a longer investment horizon. They see their company more as a 
heritage to their descendant and are more interested in firm long-term performance than 
the short term. Therefore theoretically families should perform well in long term.   
  
Because of the features of family owned companies, it is possible to study the 
performance of the family owned firms from the perspective of agency theory. When 
ownership and control are separated, agency problems arise between principals and 
 53 
agents. Managers try to maximize their own wealth, which may not be in line with 
owner’s benefits (agency problem I). This leads to agency costs of monitoring the 
management and bonding costs to align the interest of owners and managers. 
Concentrating ownership and control is effective in small and simple companies but 
when the complexity of the firm grows costs of having incompetent managers exceeds 
the savings from the concentration of ownership and control. Furthermore, agency 
problems II suggests that majority shareholders try to access private gains, which harms 
the minority shareholder. The question is, are the families able to get cost savings in 
agency costs from combining ownership and control low and do the other agency costs 
from pursuing for private gains at the expense of the minority shareholder stay at a 
reasonable level.  
 
Previous empirical research from the US and Western Europe have studied this issue by 
utilizing financial ratios ROA and Tobin’s Q and by comparing family companies and 
non-family companies within the same industry. The previous empirical evidence has 
been consistent with their results and that on average family firms outperform other 
companies. These results have also confirmed the so-called “founder effect”. Firms tend 
to perform better when the founder acts actively in the company. Furthermore, better 
performance of family owned firms seems to be linked to the shareholder protection 
laws and corporate governance regulations of the countries. When the shareholder 
protection laws and corporate governance regulations are on a developed level, it 
prevents families from pursuing for private benefits on the expense of minority 
shareholders. Moreover, the descendants and family members should only work for the 
company if they are competent. This becomes crucial when the family member works in 
a managerial position. 
 
By utilizing panel data from Finnish listed firms during 2007–2013 and random effects 
GLS regression, this research shows evidence that listed family owned firms do 
outperform other firms when measuring performance with accounting performance ratio 
ROA and when observing against other listed firms in general. Unlike in previous 
international studies, no evidence for so-called founder effect could be found from listed 
Finnish family firms. Furthermore, when identifying other controlling shareholder 
blocks, no evidence of outperformance by family firms could be found. 
 
This thesis opens opportunities for further research. For future research, studying the 
same firms with a longer data sample as family companies are usually risk averse and 
have longer investment horizon and therefore the long term profitability and excess 
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returns of founder family owned companies compared to non-family owned companies 
should be studied. Also a subset research from the performance during different 
financial and economic crisis could be done using this new data and would give an 
opportunity to compare if there is a difference between family firm performance during 
good and bad times. As better firm performance of family firms has been proven, an 
extension of studying the market valuations and the possible premium or discount that 
family ownership would have to the stock prices could be studied. Further, this study 
should be extended to non-listed family firms in Finland. A significant amount of non-
listed firms in Finland can be defined as family firms and currently the performance of 
these companies has not been studied rigorously enough and utilizing the more 
sophisticated model compared to Tourunen (2009) should also be done to non-listed 
family firms. 
 
The results show signs of possible positive association between market based firm 
performance within financial blockholder group. It can be argued that private equity and 
other activist long-term investing companies have some similar features as family firms 
(such as own capital invested in the company) and thus this blockholder could open 
opportunities for further research. 
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